Loose Lips Sink Ships

By Salena Zito

When is it OK to sacrifice national security for personal gain or political one-upmanship?

For the common-sense-challenged, the answer is: "Never."

In the years since Sept. 11, an odd assembly of Capitol Hill-types, their staffers and disgruntled federal employees from myriad intelligence agencies have played the "gotcha game" with the White House's methods of protecting the citizenry.

Enabled by the media (which, by the way, have Ph.D.s in "gotcha"), they have become desensitized to the reasons some things must remain secret.

They're making secret-revealing an extreme sport.

Intentional, or even unintentional, leaks dry up productive intelligence-gathering techniques; Americans are placed at risk.

The National Security Agency doesn't confirm, deny, justify or clarify public discussions of its operations. To do so would give insight to those wishing to harm the United States -- insight that would allow our enemies to adjust and change their own tradecraft.

"Given the nature of our work, it would be irresponsible for us to comment on actual or alleged operational issues; therefore, we have no information to provide," Don Weber, NSA spokesman, said in response to one question. "However, it is important to note that NSA takes its legal responsibilities seriously and operates within the law."

Have we as a nation forgotten the basics of the art of war? Are we so misguided as to believe that the ACLU will protect us better than the NSA in this era of terrorism?

Intel techniques -- which never should be made available for public consumption -- provide an essential means for preventing new attacks on Americans' lives. That's "prevent attacks on Americans' lives," not "intrude on Americans' lives."

Some people, in their lust to be dethroners of all things Bush, seem to forget why intel leaks from any government entity hold the potential for harm.

Our enemies do learn things from leaks. Thanks to that little thing called the Internet, stories about the NSA can be read in some cave in Afghanistan. It is almost shameful to think that we're providing great amusement to our enemies by systematically handing them every methodology we've developed.

To the extent that our spying techniques are known, it can alter the behavior of the people we need to know about. Or, based on what they know of what we're doing, they can feed us false information.

In some cases, the information we have depends on entities or people giving it to us or cooperating with us. To the extent that information is compromised, it can determine what people decide to give (or not give) our intel community.

Think of it in these terms: If you're an analyst and you have information that is important and sensitive, you may be reluctant to circulate it if you're afraid it will leak. Thus, important information can remain in a "stovepipe," unshared.

As one senior government official told me, "If there is a perceived breakdown in discipline, the danger becomes (that) we will see an open season on secrets. Leaking may beget leaking."

After the next attack, the next second-guessing commission undoubtedly will excoriate the government.

It's pretty much the only time that doves become hawks -- or, should I say, vultures.